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In 1948, colonial rule in South Africa adopted the infamous apartheid system, whose racial 
segregation policies saw the systematic exclusion of Blacks from key economic, political and 
social sectors of society, and restricted their freedom of movement. Laws were passed 
excluding black people from employment positions and restricting them primarily to manual 
and menial labour. The end of apartheid in 1994 marked a transition to a more inclusive system 
of government. However, for the new government to move forward, it was imperative that the 
imbalances of the past be redressed in order to place previously disadvantaged racial group on 
an even footing with the dominant minority group.  
Section 9 of the Constitution enshrines the right to equality for everyone and prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race or many other demographic factors. But an important 
exception to the right of formal equality exists in order to advance substantive equality. It is 
suggested that ―policies and practices put in place to suit everyone may appear to be non-
discriminatory, but may not address the specific needs of certain groups of people. In effect 
they are indirectly discriminatory, creating systemic discrimination.‖
1
 Formal equality, it is 
argued, applied without reasonable exceptions aimed to correct existing and historical 
discrimination, can only reinforce and continue the old discriminatory policy de facto. 
Affirmative action (AA) is the flagship policy endeavour of a moral philosophy that prioritizes 
substantive equality over formal.  
In the workplace, AA aims to achieve demographic equality in all levels of the labour force, 
but the application of such policies is complex. Courts have grappled with the implementation 
of AA measures and with ethical and constitutional consideration. Does the exclusion of non-
black racial groups from certain positions, even on the basis of a claim to improve substantive 
equality, amount to discrimination and is it therefore, in violation of the Constitution? The first 
Constitutional Court case to deal with AA measures was the 2004 Minister of Finance and 
Others v Van Heerden.
2
 This paper was the locus classicus until in 2014, when the Barnard 
case, the focus of this paper, changed the application of law, now the binding judgment with 
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respect to AA measures. This paper will critically analyse the judgment of the Barnard case 
and concludes with a discussion of how and where the court erred in its judgment.  
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Prior to 1994, South Africa endured the political system of apartheid. This system placed 
destructive restrictions on the rights and movements of non-white South Africans, greatly 
restricting their access to economic resources and to employment. The consequences of these 
policies remain with us still, despite the abolishment of those discriminatory laws. Previously 
disadvantaged groups marginalised by the apartheid regime largely remain disadvantaged, and 
suffer economically. With the demise of apartheid, the widespread economic, social, and 
human damage of their policies demanded a priority solution.  
The Preamble of the Constitution
3
 recognizes the injustices of the past the need to redress 
them. One measure aimed to do so and reverse the effects of apartheid is affirmative action 
(hereafter referred to as AA).  According to Higginbotham, an American academic, AA is an 
integral part of post-apartheid South Africa.
4
 
AA involves treating people belonging to a specified demographic group differently in order 
that they collectively move towards obtaining an equitable share of a specified good, resource 
or opportunity.
5
 While superficially, this may look discriminatory and a violation of equality 
before the law, the constitution makes exception for policies needed to redress past wrongs. 
The economic outcomes of South African demographic groups are unequivocal in 
demonstrating the problem, and the constitutional duty to provide remedy for those groups is 
similarly unequivocal. And AA while a highly debated and controversial concept is the primary 
tool turned towards fulfilling that duty.  
In the area of employment, AA seeks to ensure that specified demographic groups are fairly 
represented in the workforce.
6
 AA has further been defined as policies that take into 
consideration, factors including race, colour, religion, sex, and national origin in order to 
benefit an under-represented group in areas of employment, education and business.
7
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Over the years, the court has explored the principles used to justify the implementation of 
affirmative action measures. Little opines that ―blacks do not occupy stations of political, 
economic, professional and educational prominence in numbers that are proportional to their 
representation in the general population.‖
8
 It is in the consideration of these demographic ratios 
that systemic institutionalised inequality is evidenced and that in turn, is the basis for AA. The 
Constitution makes reference to AA under section 9(2), which argues that in the pursuit of 
substantive equality measures must be taken to protect persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.  
The Employment Equity Act
9
 (hereafter referred to as the EEA) was passed to give effect to 
section 9(2). The Act states that ―the focus of the EEA appears different from that of the 
Constitution which emphasises that people from designated groups should equitably be 
represented‖.
10
 The main objectives of the EEA are to eliminate unfair discrimination
11
 and to 
train and employ people from previously disadvantaged backgrounds.
12
 The Act identifies 
these previously disadvantaged groups as Blacks (including Africans, Coloureds and Indians), 
women and the disabled.
13
 A recent High Court judgment
14
 concluded that Chinese also fall 
under the designated groups as envisaged by the EEA.  
Fredman contends that since 1998 and the enactment of the EEA, AA has become a pivotal 
tool in redressing workplace inequalities in South Africa.
15
 She further states that AA is a 
temporary intervention of preferential treatment to rectify the consequences of discrimination 
in order to enable people to compete as equals for opportunities.
16
 According to the EEA, the 
purpose of AA is the achievement of equality in the labour market. This may be done by the 
promotion of equal opportunities for the designated groups and fair treatment of employees 
through elimination of discrimination; and the atonement of the detrimental employment 
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policies against the designated groups to ensure that there are equally represented in all 




1.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this dissertation is to define AA in light of the different views offered by 
academic writers in a South African context. This research will evaluate the AA policy in 
South Africa in relation to the South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard case.
18
 A 
critical analysis of all the Barnard judgments
19
 will explore how the decision adds to AA 
jurisprudence. 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
More than 20 years after the demise of apartheid, South Africa continues to be one of the most 
unequal countries in the world with respect to racial economics. This rationale of this study is 
to define AA so that the reader can identify its main attributes; then to critically evaluate the 
impact of the ground-breaking Barnard judgment and consider its significance on AA 
implementation in the workplace.  
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
This research employs a qualitative methodology. All resources were obtained via desktop 
research of secondary sources.  This research analyses legislation, case law, textbooks and 
journal articles discussing the topic of AA. Relevant case law was obtained online. 
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1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS 
The following questions are considered in this dissertation. 
1. What is affirmative action? 
 What prompted this policy? 
 What are its goals? 
 What is substantive equality? 
 How is AA implemented? 
2. What principles regarding AA can be learned from the Barnard case? 
 What was said at the initial Labour Court hearing? 
 On appeal, did the Labour Appeal Court change the decision of the Labour Court, 
and if so, how? 
 Was the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter referred to as the SCA) 
any different? 
 Finally, what principles did the Constitutional Court establish? 
3. What impact does the Barnard decision have on AA in the workplace? 
4. Was the court right, and should the principles developed in the Barnard case be 





2.1 What is affirmative action? 
Nelson Mandela, the late former President of the Republic of South Africa, once said 
―To millions, Affirmative Action is a beacon of positive expectation. To others it is an alarming 




Such is the divisive nature of AA, a policy which at its core involves advantaging one group 
over. The term AA originated in the United States of America (USA) and comprises ―a range 
of programmes directed towards targeted groups in order to redress inequalities due to 
discriminatory practices.‖
21
 Affirmative action policies, as practiced in the USA, usually have 
the following attributes: 
a) They are imposed by authority of law, either state (provincial) or federal. 
b) They require schools and employers to give preferential consideration for educational 
and job opportunities to persons of designated demographics.
22
 
Dupper states that AA has two primary aims; to alter the labour force and to increase 
demographic representation in government, public committees, and educational institutions
23
. 
Faundez summarizes AA as ―treating people belonging to a specified group differently so that 
they obtain an equitable share of a specified good‖.
24
 In the workplace, AA is aimed at 
ensuring that the selected group is equitably represented in the work force of an employer. For 
Adams the term AA means both racial preferential treatment, and also the redistribution of 
resources and opportunities.
25
 According to the Green Paper on the Conceptual Framework for 
Affirmative Action Management of Diversity in the Public Sector, AA was defined as: 
―a strategy for the achievement of employment equity through redressing imbalances in: 
i. organisational culture 
ii. staff composition, 
iii. human resource management practices and 
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iv. service provisioning 
and thereby ameliorating the conditions of individuals and groups in the workplace‖.
26
 
From these definitions it is clear that AA policies are aimed at redressing inequalities of the 
past. South Africa and the USA share a history of racial inequalities and discrimination, albeit 
with enormous historical different contemporary challenges. Unsurprisingly, their AA policies 
also differ from ours. While AA policies are imposed by the government, they are often 
directed at places of employment, the education sector, public and private offices, and even 
government representatives. 
2.2 What prompted the policy? 
Inequality in the South African labour market arose out of statutory discrimination in the 
workplace, and other policies of the apartheid regime. Little‘s 1994 study it found that ―blacks 
do not occupy stations of political, economic, professional and educational prominence in 
numbers that are proportional to their representation in the general population‖.
27
 While this 
picture has changed drastically in political and public sector positions, it remains true in the 
private economic, professional and educational sectors. In these economic and social areas 
Blacks are greatly under-represented in management, while being over-represented in low level 
positions. South Africa‘s discriminatory history has also left women and those with disabilities 
behind. Opportunities for education, employment, promotion, and wealth creation have been 
denied to these disadvantaged groups, who together constitute a majority of South Africans.
28
  
The ‗apartheid workplace regime‘
29
 introduced job reservation, and denied organising rights to 
black South Africans.
30
 During the colonial and apartheid eras, successive governments used 
legislation to curtail the economic advancement of Blacks, while allocating vastly 
disproportion resources towards the development of Whites through education, housing and 
health facilities, to name only a few. This history demonstrates why the need for positive and 
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Under apartheid, government passed sweeping laws with huge effect on the labour landscape. 
Black access to employment and economic resources was severely restricted.
32
 These laws and 
regulations militated against Blacks in the workplace, in government, and in other corridors of 
power.  
Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act
33
 allowed the Minister of Labour to restrict the 
entry of Blacks into designated fields. The Bantu Laws Amendment Act
34
 introduced the 
power to implement job reservations against African workers in any field of employment. The 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development was empowered to end and prohibit Bantu 
labour in a specific area, class of employment, trade, or in service to a specified employer or 
class of employers.
35
 The Minister had all but complete power in reserving any job he felt was 
threatened by African labour.
36
  
According to the Employment Equity Bill, black people have suffered as a result of job 
reservation and lack of access to skills and education under apartheid,
37
 leaving many 
inadequately trained and economically disempowered. Adams justifies the introduction of AA 
policies by stating that if nothing is done to  
―…. change social relations and to provide blacks with access to resources and means to overcome the 
economic marginalization of the past, the patterns of economic control, ownership and management 
that have been produced by the apartheid system will remain unchanged even in a non-racial, non-
sexist democratic South Africa.‖
38
 
As a result of the workplace laws and regulations against Blacks during apartheid, the 
employment statistics for top positions make for alarming reading. In the private sector in 1994, 
the top 5% of South Africans owned 88% of the country‘s wealth, and 95% of managerial 
positions were held by white males.
39
 Blacks accounted for only 2% of a total of 2550 
directorships in the top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.
40
 In 1998, a 
survey discovered that Blacks held only 6% of managerial positions whilst Indians and 
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 Top managers were 86% white. In a 2000 survey, it was found that of the 
560,000 workers employed by South Africa‘s 161 largest companies, 10% of managers were 
black and 5% Coloured or Indian.
42
 This meant that an overwhelming 80% of managers were 
white. And with respect to gender, only 21% of managers were female.
43
  
At the time, the public sector showed a similar pattern. Senior public sector positions were 58% 
white to 31% Black.
44
 The October Household Survey confirmed this underrepresentation of 
black and overrepresentation of white workers in top management and professional positions.
45
 
And the Breakwater Monitor Report of 1999 found that Whites received 74% of management 
promotions and 54% of skilled promotions. The report went on to find that the recruitment rate 






 discusses major reasons for the necessity for employment equity legislation, the first 
being discrimination, and the resultant inequalities. The rationale for employment equity laws 
arises from the need to eradicate inequalities still visible in the South African labour market. 
According to the Green Paper, employment equity legislation aims to: 
―Help redress the disadvantages emanating from past racial policies and as far as 




Tinarelli argues that discrimination is prevalent in the following areas: 
 Employment seclusion ; 
 segregation  in the appointment, promotion, training selection, transfer and dismissal of 
employees; 
 unjustified disparities in relation to benefits and pay; and 
 shortage of training and advancement opportunities49 
                                                          
41
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Tinarelli‘s next argument rests on the need for economic growth, suggesting that income and 
occupation inequalities by race and gender have adverse economic consequences and that 
economic growth might be stimulated by addressing social inequalities. This may be achieved 




The third rationale for employment equity in Tinarelli‘s argument is the fulfilment of the 
requirements of the Constitution and the International Labour Organisation. The Constitution 
contains an equality clause in section nine
51
 providing that every person is equal before the law 
and is therefore entitled to equal treatment and not be subject to any form of discrimination. 
But the constitution limits this with a clause that imposes an obligation on the state to legislate 
to protect and advance previously disadvantaged groups of people.  
Section 39 of the Constitution asks the courts to consider international law in interpreting the 
provisions of the Constitution.
52
 It follows that AA must be implemented in accordance with 
international law. When South Africa ratified Convention 111 of the International Labour 
Organisation
53
 it took on the obligations of its provisions. The Convention requires member 
states to take special measures to provide special protection and assistance to those who need 
it.
54
 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
55
 
provides guidelines to determine whether or not affirmative measures are acceptable and how 
they should be formulated.
56
 It sets out important limits of: ―(a) necessity; (b) proportionality to 
the aim to be achieved; and (c) time limits for affirmative action measures‖
57
. Article 1(4) of 
the Convention unequivocally states that: 
―Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial 
or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure 
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do 
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
49




 The Constitution op cit note 4 section 9. 
52
 Ibid section 39. 
53
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56
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The International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and 
Political Rights
59
 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women
60
 also require state parties to adopt and implement policies to eliminate 
discrimination and to further affirmative action. In view of the South African constitution, and 
the numerous international conventions mentioned above, it should be clear that fulfilment of 
Constitutional and international obligations requires and justifies affirmative action, provided 
that it is necessary, proportional, and limited. 
 
2.3 How was AA implemented? 
Adams stated that deliberate and practical steps would have to be implemented to eliminate 
inequalities created by deliberate design.
61
 Steps to implement AA were first promulgated by 
the interim Constitution section 8(1)
62
 which guaranteed every person the right to equality 
before the law and to equal protection of the law. However, section 8(3) (a) of the same 
Constitution states that, 
―This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate protection and 
advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.‖
63
 
This means that while affirmative action policies may violate the right to equality before the 
law and equal protection, they are justified under this provision. The final Constitution
64
 
adopted a similar approach. From the outset, the Constitution acknowledges that apartheid has 
had long term effects on social, economic and political relations. Notably, the preamble states 
that 
                                                          
58
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―We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past….. We therefore, through 
our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so 
as to heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights…‖
65
 
Section 9(2) of the final Constitution states that, 
―Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.‖
66
 
The court in Brink v. Kitshoff NO
67
 affirmed the importance of the right to equality. The 
Constitution
68
 acknowledges that South Africa has a past of institutionalised inequality and 
seeks to redress this by promoting the right to equality. However, the same Constitution 
contains a limitation clause in section 36.
69
 According to this section, no right is absolute, 
including the right to equality, and limitations of constitutional rights are permitted to the 
extent that it is "reasonable and justifiable in an open democratic society based on . . . equality 
and freedom.‖ The question then is whether or not affirmative action is a justifiable limitation 
of the right to equality. Abdelrahman states that it is the duty of the court to determine the 
degree to which affirmative action programs may be undertaken, without conflicting with the 
Constitution's core principle of equality.
70
 The provisions in the final Constitution were 
subsequently given effect by the EEA. 
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2.4 Substantive equality 
One of the key goals of affirmative action is the achievement of substantive equality, but in 
doing so they compromise formal equality. Both are central constitutional principles, therefore 
it is imperative to make the distinction between them clear. Formal equality requires that all 
persons, under the same situation and circumstances be accorded similar treatment. But in a 
society with a history of formal inequality, and a remaining social and economic impact, formal 
equality  is insufficient to remove deeply entrenched patterns of social disadvantage.
71
 Formal 
equality requires restraint from the state, but substantive equality imposes a positive obligation 
to put different demographic groups on equal footing.
72
 A policy of substantive equality 
ensures that laws do not buttress the ―subordination of groups already suffering social, political 
or economic disadvantage and requires that laws treat individuals as substantive equals, 
recognising and accommodating people‘s differences.‖
73
  
The South African Constitution aims to achieve substantive equality by first eliminating 
existing discriminatory laws and secondly to implement ―measures designed to protect and 
advance those people disadvantaged by past discrimination.‖
74
 Dupper identifies three aspects 
of substantive equality.
75
 Firstly, it requires the state to act positively to address the inequalities 
of the past. Secondly, substantive equality is asymmetrical,
76
 meaning that there is a distinction 
made between discrimination against previously disadvantaged groups and discrimination 
aimed at remedying that very disadvantage. Finally, substantive equality rejects the notion of 
individualism, as AA policies by their design, will sometimes treat individuals unfairly in order 
to achieve a larger social and economic transformation. From these characteristics, one can 
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2.5 The Employment Equity Act78 
The EEA gives effect to the constitutional provisions relating to affirmative action in the 
workplace.
79
 Section 2 of the Act states that its purpose is to promote equal opportunity and fair 
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination
80
 and to implement 
AA policies so as to redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated 
groups. These efforts would help to ensure the equitable representation of the designated 
groups in all occupational categories and levels of the workforce.
81
  
The Act goes on to define the meaning of designated employer and designated groups. These 
definitions tell us to whom the provisions of the act apply. The act designates these groups as 
black people, women and people with disabilities. Furthermore, the Act defines designated 
employers as organs of the state, or private employers with 50 or more employees.
82
 The Act 
does not apply to members of the National Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency or the 
South African Secret Service.
83
 
The EEA also imposes duties on employers necessary to fulfil their obligations under the Act. 
One of these main duties is to prepare an employment equity plan as set out in section 20. 
According to Grogan, the plan must be aimed at achieving reasonable progress towards 
employment equity.
84
  Section 20 sets out the form and requirements of an employment equity 
plan, which include a yearly set of objectives, the AA measures to be implemented, a timeline 
and duration for the plan, and internal procedures to resolve any related disputes.
85
 Grogan 
states that the aim of these measures is to identify and eliminate employment barriers that affect 
people from the designated groups.
86
 These measures are designed to foster diversity in the 
workplace based on the principle of equal dignity and respect for all people
87
 as well as the 
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making of reasonable accommodation towards these aims.
88
 Section 15 describes AA measures 
as ―designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal 
employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workforce of a designated employer.‖ The section goes on to state that such 
measures may include the retaining and the ―development of people from designated groups 
and the implementation of appropriate training measures.‖
89
   
Grogan further states that the employment equity plan should not be compiled unilaterally.
90
 
According to sections 16 and 17, the employer must take reasonable steps to consult and reach 
agreement with a representative trade union or if none exists, with its employees or 
representatives nominated by them.
91
 The employer must consult with all employees including 
those not from the designated groups, as such consultations must reflect the interests of all 
groups.
92
 The consultations, explained in section 17
93
 must include the analysis, preparation 
and implementation of the employment equity plan and the report referred to in section 21. 
Furthermore, the plan must be made available to all employees.
94
 Employers are bound to 
report to the Director-General on their progress implementing its employment equity plan. 
However, as there are no punitive measures in place for those who fail to submit their reports 
the EEA does not provide sufficient mechanism for enforcement. 
Section 21 draws a distinction between employers at or above the 150 employee‘s threshold, 
and those below, with respect to their report submissions. Larger employers, those above the 
threshold, were given a year from the date of implementation of the EEA
95
 to submit progress 
reports, and thereafter must submit progress reports once every two years at the beginning of 
October.
 96
 Those smaller employers below the 150 employee threshold were given six months 
to submit their first report,
97
 and requiring a progress report every 6 months thereafter.
98
  The 
Act then requires employers to assign personnel to monitor and manage the implementation of 
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the employment equity plan.
99
 The employer must ―provide the managers with the authority 




Regarding enforcement of AA provisions, any employee may alert the labour inspector, the 
Director-General of the Employment Equity Commission, the employer himself, other 
employees and/or trade unions of any alleged violation of the provisions of the Act. According 
to Grogan, Labour Inspectors appointed under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 are responsible for inspecting progress and ascertaining compliance with the Act.
101
 A 
company that is not in compliance is issued a compliance order and subject to a fine.
102
 Failure 
to comply with the order will then initiate civil legal proceedings by the Director-General in the 
Labour Court.
103
 The Labour Court would then make the compliance order an order of the 
court. 
The EEA also introduces ―income differentials,‖ which refer to ―the ratio between the 
remuneration of workers at different levels and in different occupational categories.‖
104
 Section 
27(1) requires designated employers to report to the Employment Conditions Commission on 
the remuneration and benefits received by each of its occupational categories and levels.
105
 If 
the Commission finds unfairly disproportionate disparities between employment levels, it may 
order measures to progressively reduce such differentials in accordance with guidance given by 
the Minister of Labour.
106
  
Under the terms of the act, state tenders and contracts are rewarded only to those in compliance 
with the EEA and in good standing with the Commission.
107
 Section 53 sets out that a letter of 
good standing from the Minister of Labour, valid for one year, demonstrates that the employer 
is eligible for state contracts.
108
 Furthermore, the Act also imposes a minimum fine of 
R500,000 for failure to comply with the provisions of the Act.
109
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 In order to assist employers achieving compliance, the Code of Good Practice
110
 was enacted. 
It forms the guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an employment equity 
plan.
111
 The Code also provides useful guidelines on the purpose, rationale, structure, 
construction process, monitoring and evaluation of the employment equity plan. Article 8(3) of 
the Code highlights some examples measures needed for an employer to achieve the goals of 
their employment equity plan. These include: 
 Preferential appointment of members from designated groups in order to achieve 
representivity in the workplace; and 
 Devote more resources to training and development of people from designated groups, 
in order that they may be suitably qualified for positions, and enlarging the pool of 
qualified candidates. 
 
2.6 What are the goals of affirmative action 
The Employment Equity Act states its objectives in section two, which explains that 
employment equity aims to ―implement AA measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups in order to ensure their equitable representation 
in all occupational categories and levels of the workforce.‖
112
 According to Little, the universal 
goal of AA is to make reparation to a numerically small class to make up for disadvantages 
caused by past governmental or widespread social repression.
113
  
Adams lists five key ambitions for AA. Firstly, AA seeks to achieve the ―removal of all forms 
of discrimination, formal and informal, and all obstacles to equal opportunity.‖
114
 This 
objective of AA is also highlighted by section 9 of the Constitution which enshrines the right to 
equality.
115
 According to Wessels, this indicates the foundational importance of this concept.
116
 
The Green Paper states that the term ―equal opportunities‖ refers both to a ―principle enshrined 
within the ideal of a representative public service to ensure equality in employment for the 
equal enjoyment of rights, opportunities, benefits and access in the workplace, and a tool to 
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By facilitating a space for equal opportunity, we make it possible for disadvantaged groups to 
gain access to economic resources
118
 previously denied through apartheid legislation and 
regulations. So empowered, previously disadvantaged groups would be in a position to make 
greater contributions to society and to furthering the project of substantive equality,
119
 This 
requires that these groups be given access to the corridors of power where they will be able to 
lead and partake in decision-making processes.  
The Green Paper also lists seven objectives of Affirmative Action. These are: 
i. ―bringing about representation in composition of staffing at all levels across all 
occupational classes in which the disadvantaged are under-represented, 
ii. legitimising the public service by transforming institutional culture and organisational 
environment in accordance with the principles of broad representation, 
iii. enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the public service by improving 
productivity and transforming service provisioning according to the principle of 
equitability and in manners that are responsive and sensitive to communities, 
iv. building institutional capacity and promoting a professional ethic by enhancing 
commitment, motivation and morale of public servants through inter alia, organisational 
development and the appropriate management of diversity, 
v. developing personnel management styles, 
vi. employment equity through the development of equitable personnel administration 
policies and practices for the equalisation of access and outcomes, 
vii. Democratising the state by including the participation of stakeholders in AA matters that 
were traditionally excluded from policy making, planning, implementation, monitoring 
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter began with defining AA and identifying the important elements that 
characterise it both South Africa and in the USA. While AA measures target places of 
employment, the education sector, public offices and even government representatives, 
this dissertation focuses on the employment sector, both private and public. The Chapter 
also highlighted the rationale behind AA policies in South Africa, presenting employment 
statistics both in the apartheid and post-apartheid era. International law and Constitutional 
obligations were discussed, along with the role of substantive equality and its relevance 
in terms of institutionalised inequality. The Chapter then looked at implementation in 
South African law through the EEA, what AA seeks to achieve, and in particular, what 















, from the LC up until the CC, raised a variety of issues relating to AA 
measures in South African law. The court made ground-breaking judgments, some of which 
were over-turned on appeal. The judgments revolved around three main issues: identifying who 
the true beneficiaries of AA are, the appropriate standard of review and the debate between 
representivity and service delivery. This chapter discusses the law relating to these three issues 
prior to the Barnard cases. 
3.1 Who are the true beneficiaries of affirmative action?  
A correct and consistent implementation of AA requires first that the law identify who the 




 while vaguely worded, attempts to categorise 
the appropriate beneficiaries of AA measures.
124
 Section 9(2) refers to ―persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination‖ as the target of affirmative action measures,
125
 and provides for the 
enactment of legislation to facilitate the right to equality, which became the EEA.
126
 The EEA 
states that the Act applies to people from designated groups,
127
 defined as black people, women 
and people with disabilities.
128
 The phrase ―black people‖, according to the Act, means 
Africans, coloured and Indians whilst people with disabilities are those who have a ―long-term 
or recurring physical or mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of entry 
into or advancement in employment.‖
129
 At first glance, the definitions provided by the EEA 
might seem adequate, but a closer look shows that is not the case. Mushariwa notes two 
conflicting schools of thought regarding the rightful beneficiaries of AA.
130
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According to one school of thought, it is sufficient for an individual to belong to a designated 
group in order to fall within the ambit of the remedial measure.
131
 This view is shared by 
Benatar who states that one of the objectives of affirmative action is to benefit ―not only 
Blacks, but other categories of people, including women.‖
132
 Furthermore, in Dudley v City of 
Cape Town,
133
 the court held that there is no individual right to AA, nor is there an enforceable 
claim. In the implementation of AA measures, it is imperative to identify historically 
disadvantaged individuals.
134
  On the other hand, Dupper et al maintains that ―in order to be 
identified as a beneficiary of affirmative action, the individual must have been disadvantaged 
personally.‖
135
 The court in Minister of Finance vs van Heerden adopted the second approach 
in holding that the objective of section 9(2) is to remedy the injustices of the past, not only on 
the premise of race, but gender and class as well and ―other levels and forms of social 
differentiation  and systemic under-privilege.‖
136
  Dupper also argues that over-emphasis on 
race as the sole criterion for deciding the beneficiaries of affirmative action is irrational and 
imposes an otherwise unfair burden on those who are excluded.
137
  
3.2 The proper standard of review of affirmative action measures: Section 9(2) of the 
Constitution 
The court, in the Barnard case, also grappled with which standard of review applies to 
affirmative action measures. According to McGregor,  
―the constitution committed itself to a standard which requires a limitation of a right to be 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, the question which then has to be asked is: ―which of the two - a rationality 
standard or a fairness-based standard – has the ability to do justice to the justificatory burden that 
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The legal position as stated in Minister of Finance and Other v Van Heerden 
In the Van Heerden
139
 case, the Constitutional Court had to decide if a pension fund, which 
allowed differentiation based on three categories with regards to contributions to that particular 
fund, amounted to unfair discrimination and the infringement of the right to equality. The court 
held that there was a sufficiently close nexus between membership differentiation and the need 
of each class for improved pension benefits.
140
 The objective of the program was to distribute 
pension benefits on an equitable foundation with the purpose of decreasing the inequality 
between privileged and disadvantaged parliamentarians.
141
 In that regard, the scheme promoted 
the achievement of equality as envisaged in the Constitution. It showed a ―clear and rational 
consideration of the need of the members of the Fund and served the purpose of advancing 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.‖ In that case, the court used rationality as the 
standard to determine whether there was a connection between the restitutionary measure of 
differentiating the contributions and the need for increased pension benefits.  
The court in the Van Heerden case outlined a three-stage enquiry into the standard to which 
remedial measures must adhere. According to Moseneke J, the first stage is that the measure 
must target persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.
142
 This means that the remedial measure must be designed to favour a group or 
a category of people as envisaged by section 9(2) and such group must be shown to be 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
143
 According to Gaibie, the Constitution leaves the 




The second question to be determined is whether the measure is 'designed to protect or 
advance' those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
145
 This requirement connotes that 
restitutionary measures are directed at a future outcome. The future, being difficult to predict, 
Moseneke J suggests that it is sufficient for the measures be reasonably capable of attaining the 
desired outcome.
146
 Gaibie opines that the objectives of the programme and the means selected 
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for achieving the objective must be show to be reasonably capable of achieving the desired 
outcome.
147
 Lastly, the measure must promote the achievement of equality.
148
 This requires 
analysis of the likely effect of the measures towards making a broader society that is non-sexist 




According to Pretorius, the first two legs of the Van Heerden
150
 test cover aspects of a rational 
relationship enquiry.
151
 The test questions the remedial measure‘s capacity to achieve ―the 
desired outcome of protecting and advancing those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.‖
152
 
However, whether the third question of the test utilises considerations which go beyond 
rationality depends on the interpretation of the court of the day. According to Pretorius, a 
narrow interpretation would entail that the section 9(2) requirements are kept within the bounds 
of a rationality enquiry. This was the interpretation adopted in the case of Alexandre v 
Provincial Administration of the Western Cape, Department of Health
153
 where it was held that 
it is sufficient that restitution measures be a ―rational means of advancing the legitimate aims 
of affirmative action.‖
154
 Gaibie argues that the second and third legs of the test are broad 
concepts and they should form the foundation for all employment equity plans.
155
 However, 
Mokgoro J, in a separate concurring judgment, disagreed with the implications of the third leg 
of the test. It was argued that the third leg placed too much emphasis on the effect of AA 
measures on those who are not beneficiaries. Mokgoro J, instead, argued that the focus of AA 




The conflicting principles of Mokgoro J and Moseneke J bring call into question whether 
section 9(2) is a complete defence to a claim of alleged unfair discrimination or whether AA 
measures are presumptively unfair thereby requiring the employer to prove their fairness.
157
 
Moseneke‘s response to this issue is that if a measure falls squarely within the ambit of section 
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9(2), it does not constitute unfair discrimination. But measures outside the ambit of section 
9(2), do constitute discrimination and the Harksen v Lane NO
158
 test must be applied.
159
  
Moseneke states that when an AA measure is challenged as having violated the equality 
provision, the employer may argue that section 9(2) provides a complete defence, arguing that 
their meausures promote the achievement of equality and are designed to advance persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
160
 Gaibie sums up Moseneke‘s view as meaning that 
any challenge to AA measures will commence as an unfair discrimination claim and in order to 
defend the measure, the employer must establish that  
―the measure meets the requirements of section 9(2) by applying the first and second stages 
of the Moseneke test and even though discriminatory in form, are nevertheless reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society by taking all the relevant factors into 
account including the situation of the complainant in society, their history and vulnerability, 
the history, nature and purpose of the discriminatory practice and whether it ameliorates or 
adds to group disadvantage in real life context in order to determine its fairness or otherwise 
in light of the values of our Constitution."
161
 
A broader interpretation, such as that supported by Moseneke in the van Heerden case, would 
be more inclusive through the recognition and the balancing of the equality aspirations of all. 
Proportionality and fairness would be considered in determining if the measures in question 
serve the goal of advancing those previously disadvantaged as envisaged by Van Heerden’s 
third requirement. These considerations are of central importance when the court considers that 
remedial measures ―should not constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and 
undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that our long term constitutional goal would be 
threatened.‖
162
 Moseneke went further to consider the factors highlighted in Harksen v Lane 
NO
163
 which are used ―to determine whether discriminatory provision has impacted on 
complainants unfairly.‖
164
 In that regard, Pretorius states that an internal fairness requirement 
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must to be added to the third requirement. This in itself created uncertainty with regards to the 
applicable standard of review because the judgment in the van Heerden case was marred by 




Uncertainty after the Van Heerden Judgment 
The court in Du Preez v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others
166
 
adopted fairness as the appropriate standard of review with regards to restitutionary measures. 
Because this case involved judicial officers,  the measure in question was not bound to EEA 
provisions. However, the Equality Act
167
 also provides for restitution measures and the court 
had to rule on whether a measure which excluded the complainant from being shortlisted on the 
basis of his race and gender was discriminatory in nature. The court held that in determining 
whether a policy was discriminatory, the court has to decide whether it differentiates between 
categories of people, and if so, whether the differentiation bears a rational connection to a 
legitimate government purpose.
168
 However, the court went on to hold that fairness is 
determined in relation to the detrimental nature of the discrimination.
169
 In Gordon v 
Department of Health, KZN
170
 the court also held that ―in the quest to attain representivity, 
efficiency and fairness should not be compromised.‖
171
 
3.3 The service delivery versus representivity debate 
The service delivery versus representivity debate also took centre stage in the Barnard case. 
According to Mushariwa, the Barnard case deals with the implementation of employment 
equity plans in a way that balances the requirements of representivity and efficiency in the 
workplace.
172
 According to van Wyk, one of the popular criticisms of AA is that it results in 
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the lowering of standards and inefficiency.
173
 Van Wyk expands on this particular point by 
stating that the lowering of standards leads to the hiring of unqualified or underqualified 
persons and this would also result in decreased productivity and on a national scale, a lowering 
of international competitiveness.
174
 The crucial question is therefore to what extent and under 
what circumstances may restitutionary measures override service delivery and competence. 
This question is arguably more important with regard to the public sector because of the 
obligation imposed by statute on the public sector to deliver basic services. Section 195 of the 
Constitution lists the basic values and principles governing public administration. These 
principles include, inter alia, the maintenance and promotion of a high standard of professional 
ethics,
175
 the promotion of efficient, economic and effective resource utility
176
 and good 
human-resource management.
177
 In pursuit of adequate service delivery, public administration 
must adopt these values and principles.  
The court in the case of Public Servants Association of SA & others v Minister of Justice
178
 
held that representivity and efficiency are often linked, but in certain instances, tension may 
exist between these two. In such circumstances, the court may be required to strike a 
balance.
179
 The dilemma between affirmative action and the constitutionally entrenched 
requirements of of service delivery was the dominant issue in the case of Coetzer & others v 
The Minister of Safety and Security & Another.
180
 In that case, it was held that the Constitution 
postulates a balance between affirmative action measures and the provisions of the 
Constitution.
181
 In particular, the court held that the relevant provision is section 205,
182
 which 
requires that the police service discharge its duties effectively. The court also held that in this 
case, the SAPS‘s AA measures had to be balanced against the need to have an efficient 
explosives unit. The court highlighted the need to address the imbalances of the past vis-a-vis 
the ability to ―monitor the use of explosives and maintain the security of the Republic should it 
be threatened by the use or intended use of explosives and biological and related threats.‖
183
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The court in that particular case concluded that SAPS‘s justification of its remedial measures in 
that instance should fail because there was no employment equity measure in place.
184
 More 
importantly, the court held that the decision of the National Commissioner not to promote the 
applicants was wrong because it placed too much emphasis on representivity at the expense of 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE BARNARD JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
A large number of cases pertaining to the application of the EEA and AA have been brought 
before South African courts.
186
 This chapter focuses on South African Police Service v 
Solidarity obo Barnard
187
 and its significance to AA in South Africa. A brief outline of the 
facts of the Barnard case will be followed by a discussion each judgment with individual 
analysis of the court findings. 
4.1 Facts 
Captain Barnard applied for the position of Superintendent in the National Evaluation Services 
of the SAPS as advertised by the National Commissioner. She was initially shortlisted and 
achieved the highest rating (86.67%) among the candidates who applied. The only black 
candidate managed to rate about 70%.
188
 The interviewing panel decided that failure to appoint 
Barnard would compromise service delivery.
189
 But it was decided that Barnard could not be 
appointed because black men and women were under-represented in the division. The position 
was therefore withdrawn and someone else was temporarily transferred to fill it. A similar 
position was later advertised and again not reserved for designated groups.
190
 Barnard applied 
again and she was amongst the eight candidates who were shortlisted and interviewed. Again, 
Barnard managed to gather the highest rating, about 17% ahead of the next best candidate, an 
African male.
191
 The interviewing panel decided to appoint her to the post on the basis that her 
appointment would not aggravate the racial representivity of the division as she was already a 
part of the division.
192
 
Furthermore, the interviewing panel reasoned that she was the best candidate for the job 
because ―she displayed a distinct brand of passion and enthusiasm vital to the service-delivery 
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needs of the Police Service.‖
193
 However, the National Commissioner disapproved of the 
Divisional Commissioner‘s recommendation and decided not to appoint Barnard for the sole 
reason that representivity would be aggravated. Barnard pursued internal remedies and the 
CCMA unsuccessfully. She then approached the Labour Court for relief. The matter was taken 
on appeal, to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), the Supreme Court of Appeal, and subsequently 
the Constitutional Court. The courts in the Barnard cases raised three major issues. This 
chapter will discuss these issues and the relevant law prior to the Barnard case, then discuss 
whether the judgements in the Barnard case deviated from the law, and if so, in what way. 
4.2 The Labour Court Issue
194
 
The issue before the court was whether Barnard had been unfairly discriminated against on the 
ground of her race by virtue of being denied promotion twice. 
Arguments 
The applicant contented that she had been unfairly discriminated because she was denied 
promotion on two occasions for the sole reason that she was white. The respondent argued that 
the refusal to appoint Barnard was consistent with its AA plan and that white women were 
over-represented in the division. 
The decision of the court 
The court held that an employment equity plan must be implemented in harmony with the 
principles of fairness and with due considerations of the affected individual‘s right to equality.  
It further demanded a flexible approach, one that takes into account the particular 
circumstances of the individual whose rights have been adversely affected rather than a fixation 
on the numerical goals of the plan. The court held that the employment equity plans should 
give due regard to individual‘s right to equality and right to dignity.
195
 The court went on to 
state that an employment equity plan may discriminate or adversely affect individuals only to 
the degree that the application of its provisions be both rational and fair. Furthermore, the plan 
must not infringe on the individual‘s right to equality and dignity.
196
 In that regard, the court 
held that where a vacancy cannot be filled by an applicant from a category which is under-
represented because an appropriate candidate from that category cannot be found, promotion to 
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that post should not ordinarily and in the absence of a clear and satisfactory explanation be 
denied to a suitable candidate from another group.
197
 
The court found that a rational connection must exist between the provisions of the 
employment equity plan and the measures adopted to implement those provisions,
198
 and in 
certain circumstances, service delivery may be a relevant factor these considerations.
199
 The 
court then held that the SAPS bore the onus of proving that the discrimination alleged by 
Barnard is fair on a balance of probabilities. The court opined that the onus may be discharged 
by providing adequate ―evidence to enable it to understand this reasoning behind and 
justification for its decision so that the court is in a position to decide on the matter 
properly.‖
200
 In considering such evidence, Pretorius held that the respondent had discharged 
its onus to establish that the decision was both rational and fair.
201
 The Commissioner‘s 
decision ―not to appoint Barnard in these circumstances, when she was manifestly the best and 
recommended as the preferred candidate, is unfair and irrational‖ especially considering that no 
satisfactory reason was given.
202
 Furthermore, it was held that there was no evidence that 
Barnard‘s right to equality was taken into account, as well as the consideration of other 
relevant factors such as personal work history or other circumstances.
203
 
Pretorius then concluded that in his view, the failure to appoint Barnard coupled with the non-
appointment of the other two recommended candidates was an irrational implementation of the 
plan.
204
 It was also held that the respondent‘s failure to engage effectively in the mediation and 
conciliation procedures provided for within the SAPS amounted to failure to consider the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution which dictates that AA policies should be applied with due 
respect of the dignity of those who are affected.
205
 The court dismissed the contention by the 
respondent that the post was not critical for the purposes of service delivery, holding that it was 
a necessary one because the respondent saw the need to fill it, albeit temporarily.
206
 The 
considerations of efficiency or service delivery suggested no rational connection between the 
decision of the national commissioner and the overall objectives of the employment equity 
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 The court finally held that the failure to promote Barnard was a decision based on her 
race and constituted discrimination and that the applicant‘s rights to equality and dignity were 
not given due consideration.
208
 The respondent had failed to discharge the onus of proving that 
the discrimination was fair.
209




Analysis of the decision of the Labour Court  
In the Barnard case before the Labour Court, the court seems to have adopted the first school of 
thought with regards to the beneficiaries of AA. According to this school, it is sufficient for an 
individual to belong to a designated group in order to be a beneficiary of AA. Mushariwa 
observes that in the Labour Court judgment, the only reason why Barnard was not promoted 
was race, and the national commissioner failed to consider her gender in a male dominated 
field and her position as a designated group member.
211
 According to Dupper, it is apparent 
from the wording of the EEA that white women fall under the ambit of designated groups.
212
  
In that regard, the Labour Court erred by failing to consider that Barnard was a member of the 
designated group, and thereby eligible to fill the vacant position.  
The arguments of the Labour Court and Rycroft are flawed. Affirmative action measures 
should not be applied rigidly in order to conform to quotas. A flexible approach, which 
considers the backgrounds of all those affected by the policy and whether or not they are 
disadvantaged should be adopted. The court could have adopted the approach taken in the case 
of Minister of Finance v van Heerden
213
 which stated that ―the objective of section 9(2) is to 
remedy the injustices of the past not only on the premise of race, but gender and class as well 
and other levels and forms of social differentiation and systemic under-privilege.‖ In this way it 
could have been seen that through appointing Barnard, substantive equality in the domain of 
gender could be advanced. 
The Labour Court further held that there was a presumption of unfair discrimination with 
regards to the non-appointment of Barnard.
214
 It follows then that the respondent bears the onus 
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of proving that the discrimination was fair.
215
 Traditionally, in order to meet this burden, the 
respondent is must provide evidence to ―enable the court to evaluate the reasoning behind and 
justification for a decision in terms of its fairness.‖
216
 In order to prove that the decision is fair, 
the respondent must satisfy the court that it has adequately considered the individual situations 
of those adversely affected. Equity targets also must be considered, but not as the only relevant 
factor. In that regard, the Labour Court in the case of Barnard is authority for the proposition 
that fairness is the preferable standard that AA measures must achieve. In so doing, the Labour 
Court deviated from the standard of rationality which was adopted in the Van Heerden case.  
 
4.3 The Labour Appeal Court217 
Issues 
The issue before the Labour Appeal Court was if the Labour Court was warranted in 
concluding that AA measures under section 9(2) of the Constitution "must be applied in 
accordance with the principles of fairness and with due regard to the affected individual's 





The appellant argued that the decision of the National Commissioner not to appoint Barnard 
should stand in the interests of representivity. It was further reiterated that the post was not a 
critical one therefore the National Commissioner had the sole prerogative not to fill it.
219
 The 
appellant further argued that the decision of the Labour Court was wrong on the grounds that 
restitutionary measures need not yield to the right to equality and dignity.  
It was also argued that Pretorius J had failed to comprehend and appreciate that AA by its 
nature was discriminatory and was intended to accord preferential treatment to persons from 
designated groups.
220
 The appellant also stated that the consideration of the right to equality 
and dignity in the implementation of restitutionary measures was inconsistent with the objects 
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and imports of AA. For these reasons, the appellant contended, the Labour Court had 
misdirected itself in holding that the failure to appoint Barnard was unfair and inconsistent with 
the objects of the Employment Equity Act.
221
 POPCRU intervened as an amicus curiae and 
submitted that the EEA is a measure ―by which the right to equality is justifiably limited with a 
view to addressing the effects of unfair discrimination of the recent apartheid the past.‖
222
 In 
that regard, the EE Plan is a measure to achieve substantive equality in the workplace by 
ensuring equitable representation of designated groups in all occupational categories and levels 
in the appellant's workplace.
223
 
The decision of the Labour Appeal Court 
The court held that the real question was whether the implementation  of AA measures should 
be suppressed if such implementation would have a prejudicial impact only affecting persons 
from non-designated groups.
224
 The court proceeded to deal with the finding of the Labour 
Court that the failure to appoint Barnard amounted to unfair discrimination as envisaged in the 
Constitution.
225
 In deciding this question, the court considered the test in Harksen v Lane NO
226
 
where it was held that determining whether differentiation amounts to discrimination ―requires 
a two stage analysis. Firstly, whether the differentiation amount to 'discrimination' and if it 
does, whether secondly, it amounts to unfair discrimination.‖
227
 In casu, the court found that 
there was no differentiation because no appointment took place. However the court held that an 
omission, in this case failure to appoint, may amount to discrimination. The court then 
proceeded to determine whether such discrimination was unfair as contemplated by section 6 of 
the EEA.
228
 The court underscored the importance of section 6(2) of the EEA,
229
 holding that in 
certain instances, it is justifiable to discriminate under the Constitution.
230
 
The court rejected the Labour Court‘s contention that AA measures should be subjected to the 
right to equality and the right to dignity. The court held that holding otherwise would ―…defeat 
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the very purpose of having restitutionary measures in the first place, as such implementation 
would always fall short due to the presumption that adverse effects on persons from non-
designated groups would exist...‖
231
 The judge also held that the very substance of AA is to 
protect the right to equality because without such measures, the achievement of equitable 
treatment would not be possible in South Africa. An approach such as the one adopted by the 
Labour Court, they opined, would promote the interests of persons from non-designated 
categories to continue enjoying an unfair advantage which they had enjoyed under apartheid
232
 
and this would counteract legitimate constitutional objectives.  
The EEA was enacted to undertake the obligation under section 9 of the Constitution
233
 to 
address the injustices and the inequalities created by past discriminatory practices.
234
 The court 
opined that the over-representation of Whites in level 9 is a stark reminder of such 
discriminatory practices but that it could be broken by embracing the spirit of restitution found 
in the Constitution.
235
 Appointing Barnard would not have advanced the target for in the 
appellant's workforce in level 9 and the Labour Court erred in holding that her appointment to 
level 9 would have improved equity in level 8 as this would have worsened the over-
representation of white employees in level 9 and would have represented a step backwards and 
in ―direct violation of a clear constitutional objective.‖
236
 The court also rejected the Labour 
Court‘s view that failure to appoint Barnard would compromise service delivery, in the 
process, holding that it is not open to a court to "second guess" a decision that not filling a post 
will or will not compromise service delivery because the National Commissioner is the only 
person answerable with regards to service delivery matters.
237
 The court then concluded that 
Labour Court misinterpreted the purpose of restitutionary measures by holding that their 
implementation should be subject to the right to equality and the right to dignity.
238





Analysis of the decision of the LAC 
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 adopted the rationality test in determining the proper standard of review of 
affirmative action measures. In so-doing, the court followed in the footsteps of the Van 
Heerden judgment. However, rationality has been criticised for lacking the normative content 
to be able to determine whether restitutionary measures promote the overall purpose of section 
9.
241
 Pretorius further argues that rationality does not interrogate the comparative fairness of 
the impact of AA measures on the affected parties and also lacks the comparative overview 
imperative as an intermediary for equality.
242
 In his scathing critique, Pretorius adds that the 





 agrees that the rationality test has been created in isolation from section 9(2)
245
 
and section 36. The sentiments of the LAC seem to be misguided. The court should have rather 
adopted the fairness approach as discussed by the Constitutional Court below. The LAC is 
disinclined to dwell into the representivity vs service delivery debate by holding it was not its 
place to second guess the decision of the National Commissioner with regards to the effect of 
the position on the efficiency of the SAPS. This proposition is wrong. It is the duty of the court 
to ensure that state entities uphold the principles and values of the Constitution, and hold them 
accountable for their failure to do so. The LAC should have taken note of the SAPS mandate to 
uphold the values and principles enshrined in section 195 and section 205 of the Constitution.  
According to the case of Coetzer & and Others v The Minister of Security and Another,
246
 these 
principles bind every organ of state including SAPS. 
4.4 The Supreme Court of Appeal247 
Issues 
The Supreme Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the failure to appoint 
Barnard was discriminatory and if so, if it was unfair. It also had to decide whether the failure 
to appoint Barnard was in violation of the values and principles underpinning the duties of 
SAPS in accordance with section 195 of the Constitution. 
Arguments  
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Barnard argued that she had been unfairly discriminated against on the basis of her race. The 
respondent, on the other hand, was claimed that the discrimination was fair and the position 
was not critical. 
Decision of the court 
The court found that employment equity could not be achieved by mechanical application of 
formulae and numerical targets.
248
 The SCA held that the ―starting point for enquiries of the 
kind under consideration is to determine whether the conduct complained of constitutes 
discrimination and, if so, to proceed to determine whether it is unfair.‖
249
 The court also held 
that when it is alleged that a plaintiff has violated the equality clause in the Constitution, 
section 9(2) can provide a defence for such a plaintiff.
250
 The plaintiff may argue that ―the 
discriminatory policy was adopted to promote the achievement of equality as contemplated by 
section 9(2), and was designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by prior unfair 
discrimination.‖
251
 Section 11 of the EEA can provide a similar defence. Where unfair 
discrimination is alleged, the employer must establish that such discrimination was fair. The 
court went on to reject the LAC‘s assertion that Barnard was not discriminated against because 
the vacancy was not filled. It was held that Barnard was discriminated against on the basis of 
her race because if a senior African woman or man had had all of Barnard's skills and had 
achieved the same interviewing score, that person would most surely have been appointed to 
the post and that the only reason why Barnard was not appointed was because she is white.  
Having decided that there was indeed discrimination, the court set out to determine whether 
such discrimination was fair under section 11 of the EEA. The court upheld the principle in the 
Harksen
252
 case that the test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination 
on the complainant and others in his or her situation,
253
 placing the onus of proving that the 
discrimination was fair on SAPS. The court held that SAPS did not discharge that onus as their 
justifications for failing to appoint Barnard were inadequate. Furthermore, in deciding this 
issue, the court was obliged to adopt a flexible and situation-sensitive approach to the facts of 
the case.
254
 The LAC failed to adopt such an approach, and consequently failed to take into 
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account several relevant factors. These factors include that Barnard herself was part of a 
designated group because she is a woman and that a white male was temporarily appointed 
before the position was re-advertised. The decision to appoint a white male was questionable 
since race representivity within organs of state is apparent.
255
 
The court also held that despite that the National Commissioner is not bound by the evaluations 
and the recommendations of the interview panel; he must give consideration to and engage 
with what they put before him. Failure to consider relevant material and factors expose him to 
liability if legally challenged.
256
 The court also highlighted the distinctive characteristics, 
possessed by Barnard, and approved by the panel, which made her a suitable candidate for the 
vacancy. Furthermore, the court held that the recommendation by the Commissioner should 
have been taken into account by the National Commissioner in deciding whether or not to 
appoint Barnard. The court went on to affirm the argument that Barnard's promotion might 
have had the indirect effect of promoting the employment equity agenda because if Barnard 
was promoted to Superintendent, her position at the lower level (level 8) would be free and that 
would present an opportunity to enhance representivity at that level.
257
 In that regard, SAPS 
had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the discrimination was fair as envisaged by 
section 11 of the EEA.
258
 
The court went on to consider whether the justification of non-appointment based on the 
position not being a critical post. In response to this argument, it was held that it could not be 
argued that such a senior position could be created and advertised without serious 
consideration. In that regard, the post was created because it was necessary in furtherance of 
the SAPS mission of providing a professional and efficient police service.
259
 The court held 
that the SAPS are obliged to be professional and effective in the execution of their duties and 
use its resources efficiently.
260
 The court rejected the argument by the LAC that it is the 
National Commissioner‘s sole prerogative to determine whether a position is critical, and held 
that applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as the facts must be 
considered.
261
 In that regard, SAPS was prejudiced by the failure to appoint Barnard. The court 
also agreed with Barnard that failure to appoint her to a position which, with respect to the 
                                                          
255
 Supra note 248 at para 59.  
256
Supra note 248 at para 60. 
257
 Supra note 248 at para 64. 
258
Supra note 248 at para 68. 
259
 Supra note 248 at para 73. 
260
 Supra note 248 at para 72. 
261
Supra note 248 at para 74. 
37 
 
regulatory constitutional and statutory framework, must have been necessary, had a negative 
impact on service delivery.
262
  
The court also held that ―the negative impact of a double rejection on dubious grounds upon a 
loyal and dedicated servant of the SAPS‖
263
 was a factor that had to be taken into account. The 
impact on the employee and on the employer also has to be taken into account and a situation-
sensitive approach has to be adopted.
264
 The court went on to say that where there is no suitable 
person capable of fulfilling the requirements of the position, there is no reason why the only 
suitable person from a non-designated group should not be appointed.
265
 It was also held that  
―…if South Africa is to address past imbalances with affirmative-action measures, race has to 
be taken into account, but this has to be done fairly and without forgetting that the ultimate 
objective is to ensure a fully inclusive society.‖
266 
The court then concluded that SAPS had not established that the discrimination complained of 
was fair. The court reversed the decision of the LAC, holding that there was no factual 
foundation for the finding.
267
 The appeal was upheld with costs and Barnard‘s compensation 
was awarded as the difference between what she would have earned as a superintendent and 
what she continued to earn as a captain, but limited to a two-year period.
268
 
Analysis of the decision of the SCA 
The SCA
269
 in the Barnard case held that the National Commissioner should have taken into 
account that Barnard was also a woman and therefore a member of a designated group. In that 
regard, the court adopted the second school of thought which states that ―in order to be 
identified as a beneficiary of AA, the individual needs to have actually been disadvantaged 
personally.‖
270
  Rycroft, however, has his own reservations about the second school of thought. 
He argues that it is more desirable to focus on representivity, the broader and more general 
social objective of affirmative action, rather than interrogating whether ―a person in the 
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designated group comes from a wealthy background and has received the best education.‖
271
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Barnard calls for a ―situation-specific‖ approach 
which considers, inter alia, race and gender as crucial, but not conclusive factors.
272
 In this 
way, the second school of thought seems to better achieve the desired objectives of the EEA of 
redressing past unfair discrimination.  
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Barnard held the SAPS to be bound by the principles 
enshrined in section 205 of the Constitution in the execution of their duties.
273
 It therefore 
follows that the National Commissioner must have been aware that the post was created with 
the intention of furthering the mandate of the SAPS in upholding these principles. This 
suggests that the National Commissioner, in failing to appoint Barnard or to fill the position 
permanently, undermined the efforts of SAPS to provide efficient and effective service 
delivery. Section 195 and section 205‘s values and principles bind each and every organ of 
state including SAPS, as correctly held by the court in Barnard
274
 and Coetzer & others v The 
Minister of Safety and Security & Another.
275
 On the other hand, AA is also provided for by the 
same Constitution and the courts are bound to balance these competing interests and 
determining which outweighs the other, in light of the peculiar circumstances of each case.  
It should be noted that the court in Coetzer & others v The Minister of Safety and Security & 
Another,
276
 found that too much emphasis was placed on the requirement of representivity at 
the expense of efficiency. The Supreme Court of Appeal, on the other hand, reasoned 
differently, that failure to appoint Barnard had an adverse impact on SAPS obligation to 
perform their duties consistently with section 205. Indeed, Frahm-Arp, in his critique of the 
SCA decision,
277
 states that ―considerations of representivity and numeral targets are not 
absolute criteria for employment.‖
278
 Such an approach would enhance efficiency in public 
service. According to McGregor, this approach is ideal because ―affirmative action should 
apply broadly to give effect to substantive equality as enshrined in the Constitution and the 
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 She goes further to state that neither efficiency nor representivity surmounts the 
other, nor can one be scrutinised in isolation from the other because they are connected and 
interdependent.
280
 The judgment in Coetzer, however, seems to illustrate that that efficiency 
may prevail over representivity in cases involving services critical to the South African 
public.
281
 This approach is also supported by Mushariwa who states that ―suitably qualified 
individuals being appointed would equal efficiency and quality of service rather than just 
appointing individuals on the basis of race to enhance representivity.‖
282
 With that in mind, the 
approach adopted by the SCA is correct in that it recognises the importance of the values and 
principles enshrined in section 195 and section 205 of the Constitution in the representivity 
versus service delivery debate. 
 
 
4.5 The Constitutional Court283 
Issues  
The SAPS appealed the decision to the the Constitutional Court, which had then to decide 
whether the national commissioner's decision unfairly discriminated against the respondent.
284
   
Majority Judgment 
The court held that the constitution has a mission to address the inequalities of the past. Certain 
provisions in the constitution enjoin South Africans to take active steps to achieve substantive 
equality, particularly for those disadvantaged by past unfair discrimination.
285
 But the court 
went on to hold that care must be taken to ensure remedial measures do not unduly assault the 
dignity of those concerned and that furthermore, such measures are not meant to be punitive, 
but to create a more equal and fair society that is non-racial, non-sexist and socially 
inclusive.
286
 The court also held that ―…there is a positive obligation on the state to direct 
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reasonable public resources to achieve substantive equality for full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms.‖
287
 This may be best achieved by taking reasonable, prompt and effective 
measures to realise the socio-economic reforms needed by the vulnerable.
288
 
The court acknowledged that the equality clause permits what would otherwise discriminatory 
measures, when they protect or advance those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and help 
to achieve substantive equality.
289
 In determining whether a measure or a policy falls within the 
ambit of section 9(2), the following three part test is applied. 
The measure must: 
a) ―Target a particular class of people who have been susceptible to unfair discrimination; 
b) Be designed to protect or advance those classes of persons; and 
c) Promote the achievement of equality.‖290 
If a measure passes this test, it is presumed to be fair in terms of the Constitution. However, if a 
properly adopted restitution measure is then wrongfully or unlawfully applied, it may be 
challenged.
291
 A legitimate restitution measure must be implemented in such a way as to be 
rationally connected to the terms and objects of the measure and to advance its legitimate 
purpose.
292
 The court then reiterated the relevant provisions in the EEA
293
 before analysing the 
decision of the SCA. 
The Constitutional Court found against the ruling of the SCA. The SCA had set out to 
determine whether there was discrimination, and if so, whether or not it was fair.  This same 
test was applied in Harksen v Lane NO.
294
 The court held that the SCA misconceived the issue 
before it, as well as the relevant law. The issue before the court was not the validity of the 
employment equity plan, but rather whether decision of the national commissioner was open to 
challenge.
295
 On that point, the relevant law is found under section 9(2) of the Constitution
296
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and section 6(2) of the EEA.
297
 The Constitution Court found it was unwarranted to impose on 
SAPS, the onus to prove that the discrimination was fair.  
The respondent also argued that by declining to appoint Barnar, the national commissioner had 
made an unlawful and unreasonable that must be set aside. The court held that this would 
amount to a new cause of action. This would be impermissible as it would result in a review 
and the setting aside of an impugned decision.
298
 This would violate the principle of legality 
and the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
299
 
The court agreed however, with the respondent that the decision of the National Commissioner 
must be informed by the selection criteria of the National Instruction. These criteria demand 
that the successful applicant have the ―existing or potential competence to do the job‖ and an 
―acceptable record of conduct.‖ The instruction also requires that promotions heed the 
employment equity plan of the relevant business unit.
300
  
The court did agree however, that under the National Instruction, the National Commissioner 
had discretion to forgo or ignore recommendations of the interviewing panel and divisional 
commissioner.
301
 As such, the National Commissioner was not bound by these 
recommendations, and was exercising that discretion, when deciding not to appoint Barnard.  
The justification claimed for withholding the promotion of Barnard was that  it would have 
worsened representivity in salary level 9, and furthermore that the post was not critical for 
service delivery. The National Commisioner did not appoint another person from the 
designated groups (and with a lower score) even if their appointment would have improved 
representivity. For that reason, the court concluded that it could not find this the exercise of 
that discretion to be unlawful.
302
 Turning to the issue of service delivery, the court accepted the 
appellant‘s claim that the position was non-critical and and never ultimately filled. The court 
thus accepted the National Commissioner‘s argument that failure to appoint to Barnard did not 
affect service delivery.  
The court further held that the National Commissioner did not pursue the targets of the 
employment equity plan rigidly because over-representation of white females at salary level 9 
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 Barnard was also not barred from future promotions and when she went for 
the interview, she was aware that selection would occur within the structures imposed by 
employment equity.
304
 The court found in favour of SAPS, holding that an inference of 
unreasonable decision-making and illegality could not be imputed from the decision of the 
National Commissioner. In that regard, the court held that, 
―…the national commissioner exercised his discretion not to appoint Ms Barnard rationally and 
reasonably and in accordance with the criteria in the instruction, in pursuit of employment equity 
targets envisaged in s 6(2) of the Act.‖
305
 
Minority judgment per Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ 
Cameron, Froneman and Majiedt agreed with the reasoning and the outcome of the majority 
judgment, but wished to consider the tensions that follow the establishment and application of 
AA measures;
306
 and secondly to evaluate the suitable standard that should be applied when a 
litigant questions the application of a constitutionally consistent AA measure in a particular 
case.
307
 It was held that the majority judgment erred in not discussing these two issues.  This 
was the first case in which a court had to decide the standard in assessing the lawfulness of the 
implementation of constitutionally compliant restitutionary measures.
308
 The court held that the 
tension that is at issue in this case is between recognising and redressing the realities of the past 
and establishing a society that is non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive.
309
 The court held 
that race and gender are not the only forms of discrimination that have to be taken into account 
when implementing restitutionary measures.
310
 
The court also held that section 2
311
 does not determine when a restitutionary measure is 
permissible, but that the EEA must be consulted as to its relevant provisions. The Act does not 
sanction overly rigid measures and furthermore, no AA decision is compliant with the purpose 
of the Act unless it acknowledges the elevation of the designated groups in terms of the Act.
312
 
The Act also underscores the right to dignity as a fundamental one, and as a value under which 
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the Act must be interpreted.
313
 The court went on to hold that the majority judgment failed to 
consider the relevant question regarding the difference between quotas and numerical goals. 
The question was relevant because Barnard had alleged that national commissioner's 
implementation of the plan was indeed so rigid as to constitute the use of quotas rather than 
numerical goals.
314
 The question then, before the court centered on the individual 




The court held that the facts of the case required a less deferential standard than rationality, 
namely that rationality must be balanced by a consideration of fairness.
316
 Fairness is a core 
Constitutional value, especially in employment.
317
 Despite the ―open-ended‖ nature of a 
fairness criterion, the court suggested that it would ―crystallise‖ over time. Additionally, 




In applying this standard, the court investigated whether ―a specific implementation of a 
measure that is constitutionally compliant in its general form is nevertheless in conflict with the 
provisions of the Act.‖
319
 By applying this standard to the facts, the court held that due regard 
must be paid to the objective facts of the case and the reasons stipulated by the National 
Commissioner for his decision not to appoint Barnard.
320
 Upon review, the court found that the 
reasons given were insufficient, having failed to justify how he balanced the considerations of 
representivity and service delivery.
321
 While the National Commissioner had the power to 
disagree and disregard the divisional panel‘s recommendation, he was obliged when doing so, 
to adequately explain his disagreement and reasoning for chosing representivity over service 
delivery.  
The court also held that in deciding the fairness of the implementation of the equity plan, all 
relevant aspects of the candidate's identity and ways they could advance representivity in a 
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manner which complies with the Act.
322
 Furthermore, restitutionary measures must be 
implemented harmoniously with the Act, which lists women as members of designated 
groups.
323
 As such, the national commissioner was required to consider how Barnard would 
address gender representivity, as well as racial representivity.
324
 However, the court concluded 
that despite the national commissioner's failure to address adequately the question of service 
delivery, his failure to mention gender representivity was insufficient for finding his decision to 
be unfair.
325
 Furthermore, Barnard never rebutted the argument that the division was being 
restructured and that the post did not need to be filled until restructuring was complete, nor did 
she presented any argument on the basis of gender.
326
 The court also held that there was a 
greater justification for prioritising representivity over all the other considerations. The 
overriding factor was the over-representation of white women at salary level 9.
327
 Barnard‘s 
eventual promotion to the post of lieutenant-colonel also showed her non-appointment did not 
serve as a barrier to her advancement.
328
 
Minority judgment per Van der Westhuizen J 
Van der Westhuizen agreed with the reasoning and the finding of the majority judgment but 
differed, on certain matters of principle, In particular, the learned judge found that the majority 
judgment erred in refusing to review and set aside the decision of the national commissioner.
329
 
It was held that Barnard brought an application before the court to declare the implementation 
of the AA measure unlawful, pursuant to the EEA and the equality clause in the Constitution. 
Therefore in order to determine lawfulness of the implementation, it must be teststed against 
the standard of the Van Heerden
330
 case. The court also had a duty to opine on how 
implementation influenced the right to equality or human dignity.
331
 The court held that 
―schemes and conduct based on race, which arbitrarily benefit some and violate the rights of 
others, can never qualify as a legitimate measure under  9(2).‖ 
In determining whether the national commissioner‘s decision passed judicial muster, the 
learned judge held that it could be subject to review on the basis of rationality. Despite 
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Barnard‘s decision not did not raise this issue, the national commissioner was exercising public 
power in the decision not to appoint Barnard, and therefore that decision could be scrutinised 
using the rationality test. The court also held that the test in Van Heerden
332
 is relevant in 
determining whether the implementation of the equity plan passes constitutional muster. The 
test in that particular case questions whether an affirmative or restitutionary measure 
a) ―targets persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination; 
b) is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and 
c) promotes the achievement of equality.‖333 
The first two legs of the test are concerned with whether the measure is rationally connected 
with its objective while the third focuses on the implementation of the measure.
334
 In 
determining the third part of the test, rationality is insufficient, the court must also look at 
implementation. Considerations like whether the measure ―serves to advance or retard the 
equal enjoyment in practice of the rights and freedoms that are promised by the Constitution 
but have not already been achieved‖
335
 should be taken into account. The court held that the 
decision not to appoint Barnard promoted the achievement of equality because her appointment 
would have exacerbated the over-representivity of her designated group.
336
 The learned judge 
then evaluated whether the implementation of the plan passes constitutional muster in that it 
does not infringe any constitutional rights.
337
 
The court rejected the possibility of using fairness as a standard as proposed by Cameron, 
Froneman and Majiedt in their separate judgment, holding that the standard is too vague.
338
 
The learned judge proposed the use of the limitation clause
339
 in measuring the impact of 
enforcing one right over another,
340
 given that AA measures may impact on any number of 
rights and interests, both of the individuals concerned and of the public.
341
 The learned judge 
went on to consider if Barnard‘s right to dignity was infringed and held that indeed it was 
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because her attributes, experience and attitude were eclipsed by considerations of race.
342
 
However, the court held that the violation to her right were reasonable and justifiable in light of 
the goal of substantive equality.
343
 With regards to service delivery, the court held that in 
balancing the interests of service delivery versus representivity, factors like ―the nature of the 
duties of the job, the needs of the workplace and the employer, and the under- or over-
representation of the group seeking to be advanced by the AA measure should be taken into 
account.‖
344
 The learned judge then held that it could not question the national commissioner‘s 
decision on the issue of service delivery because there was not enough evidence to do so.
345
 
Analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court 
The majority judgment in the Constitutional Court
346
 held that the implementation of a 
legitimate restitution measure must be rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure 
and it must only be applied to advance its legitimate purpose.
347
 This means that the majority in 
the Constitutional Court agreed with the approach of the Labour Court. The minority, however, 
disagreed and held that a less deferential standard than rationality was required. Instead, the 
Labour Court adopted the standard of fairness, holding it as a core Constitutional value. The 
court justified this standard, holding that it would promote flexibility. Rationality as a test for 
applying section 9(2)
348
 to AA measures was rejected by the minority in the Barnard case. The 
court held that unlike section 9(2),
349
 the EEA imposes a different standard than that of mere 
rationality. Fairness, the court opined, provides a more ―exacting level of scrutiny‖.
350
 
Furthermore, the standard of fairness would ensure that ―a decision-maker has carefully 
evaluated relevant constitutional and statutory imperatives before making a decision that relies 
predominantly on one of the criteria, such as race, that are normally barred from consideration 
by section 9(3) of the Constitution.‖
351
  
The court criticized rationality as the appropriate standard of review, suggesting that it does not 
allow for balancing of multiple designated groups and their interests against those adversely 
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affected by the remedial measure.
352
 The standard of rationality has also been criticised for 
stripping section 9(2) internal requirements of all fairness content. This has the effect of 
undermining the promotion of substantive equality and detaching it from its essence.
353
 
Rationality has also further been criticised by Pretorius in that it lacks the normative 
component to be able to determine whether a restitutionary measure promotes the overall 
purpose of section 9, as well as it not containing any considerations of fairness and 
proportionality.
354
 However, Albertyn argues that, according to the majority judgment, in 
assessing the substance of employment equity plans and AA measures by the state, rationality 
meet the bare minimum standard, but is not the definitive standard.
355
 
It should also be noted that the majority in the CC upheld the three-stage inquiry which was 
established the Van Heerden case. Gaibie states that, according to the majority judgment, once 
the plan passes the three-stage Moseneke test, any AA measure taken as a consequence of it is 
not unfair or presumed to be unfair. In that regard, the majority deviated from the judgment of 
the SCA, holding that the SCA had misconceived the issue before it and consequently, the 
controlling law. The court found that the SCA had erred by failing to approach the equality 
claim through the context of both section 9(2) of the Constitution and section 6(2) of the EEA. 
The rationale behind this was that the plan opposed was unlawful and invalid. The SCA erred 
in applying the test in Harksen v Lane NO
356
 as doing so presumes the plan to be unfair. It was 
held therefore that the question before the court was never whether the plan was valid, but 
whether National Commissioner‘s decision was questionable.
357
 In applying this approach, the 
court found that a measure implemented in terms of an employment equity plan may only be 
challenged for the purpose of determining whether or not it is unlawful.
358
 The principle of 
legality therefore requires the implementation of AA measures to be rationally connected to the 
terms and objects of the measure.
359
 According to Albertyn, the effect of this is that the starting 
point for evaluating affirmative action measures and related decisions, starts with s 9(2) and not 
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unfair discrimination in s 9(3). Accordingly, AA measures are subject to divergent 
constitutional and legal benchmarks beyond s 9(3) fairness.
360
  
Gaibie finds three conceptual difficulties with the majority judgment. Firstly, only Van der 
Westhuizen J discusses the nature of the Moseneke three-legged test and the issue that the third 
leg of the test can only be considered at the implementation stage of the employment equity 
plan. This narrowed the test considerably to mere formulation and adoption of the plan and 
represents a fundamental shift from the Van Heerden judgment.
361
 Secondly, Gaibie argues that 
in equating the provisions of section 9(2) of the Constitution and section 6(2) of the EEA, the 
CC seems to have misconceived the matter.
362
 It is argued that section 9(2) is structured such 
that the right to equality may demonstrate that AA measures meeting the internal requirements 
of section 9(2) cannot be presumed to be unfair. However, the same cannot be said about 
section 6(2) of the EEA because issues relating to equality and unfair discrimination in 
employment are regulated by the Labour Relations Act.
363
 Finally, unlike the Van Heerden 
judgment, the CC failed to consider the distinction between unacceptable discrimination and 
proper AA measures. Where a challenge to an AA measure is made, it will be fair and logical 
for the employer to explain their reasons and justify their actions, ensuring that the decision is 
protected under the provisions of section 9(2) of the Constitution read together with section 
6(2) of the EEA.
364
 
Albertyn further criticizes the majority judgment for limiting the ambit of Van Heerden by 
setting a minimum rationality standard for evaluating restitutionary measures when Moseneke 
stated that they must be rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure.
365
 Moseneke 
also failed to apply the requirements of section 9(2) to the facts and circumstances of the case 
at hand. In so-doing, the learned judge circumvents ―a substantive engagement with the 
problems of evaluating affirmative action within an overall understanding of employment law 
and substantive equality.‖
366
 Instead, Moseneke reinterprets the claim as directed, not at unfair 
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discrimination based on race under section 6(1) of the Act, but at reviewing and setting aside 
the National Commissioner‘s decision not to appoint her.
367
  
The majority in the Constitutional Court held that the National Commissioner exercised his 
discretion rationally by failing to appoint Barnard because her appointment would have 
worsened representivity in salary level 9 and the post was not critical for service delivery.
368
 In 
that regard, the court was of the opinion that considerations of service delivery could not 
override the issue of representivity in the workplace. The court also overlooked other relevant 
considerations, including Barnard‘s merit and competence, focusing instead on 
representivity.
369
 The National Commissioner blatantly disregarded the selection criteria in 
terms of the National Instruction which provide, inter alia, that ―competence based on the 
inherent requirements of the job or the capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability 
to do the job and suitability‖ are some of the relevant considerations to be taken into account in 
choosing a suitable candidate.
370
  In his critique of the minority judgment, Albertyn states that 
the question before the court was whether the Commissioner had adequately explained how he 
weighed up service delivery and representivity, and had implemented the plan in a flexible and 
fair manner in a bid to avoid the de facto conversion of numerical targets into rigid quotas.
371
 
The judges found that the Commissioner‘s failure to give reasons for choosing representivity 
over service delivery, and to even consider the issue of gender representivity, were both 
indications that he was not implementing the Plan in a fair manner.
372
 
The Constitutional Court agreed with the LAC, holding that it could find no reason to object to 
the National Commissioner‘s argument that failure to appoint Barnard did not affect service 
delivery.  It could be argued though that the court should have adopted the stance set forth in 
the case of Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others
373
 where the court held that that 
the need for representivity cannot be used to legitimise the appointment of a candidate who is 
not suitably qualified and who cannot discharge his duties.
374
 This principle should also be 
extended to the public service, including the SAPS. If there is an individual who is suitably 
qualified for a position and gives every indication of the ability to discharge their duties 
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efficiently, then such a candidate should be appointed. Representivity should be one of the 
considerations which may be taken into account in deciding who the suitable candidate is, but 
it should not be rigidly applied at the expense of other important considerations. 
The role of the right to dignity 
The Barnard judgment reveals that the idea of substantive equality in s 9 remains contested, 
and even undeveloped. At this stage, it is imperative to discuss the role of the right to dignity in 
the right to equality. Various authors argue that the right to dignity should be the ‗lodestar of 
equality‘ and that unfair discrimination should be measured by equality of moral worth.
375
 
Some authors disagree with this proposition.
376
 In his critique of the Barnard CC judgment, 
Albertyn deals at length with the contesting ideas of equality. The dignity-centred approach 
was also advocated for by the Labour Court in Barnard. According to Albertyn, the purpose of 
the concept of dignity is to distinguish between differential treatment under s 9(1), subject to a 
test of rationality, and differential treatment under s 9(3) which amounts to discrimination and 
is subject to the test of fairness.
377
 Differentiation constitutes discrimination when it occurs on 
premises that have the potential to diminish dignity. Secondly, it is only when there is actual 
impairment of human dignity that this discrimination is found to be unfair. The impact of the 
impugned law or conduct on the dignity of the person complaining of discrimination is crucial. 
In that regard, dignity, is crucial to determining unfair discrimination and is predominantly 
appreciated to indicate fundamental human worth, and the need to be treated as equally worthy 
and with equal concern and respect.
378
 But this raises a problem in that if the effect on the 
dignity of the individual complainant is crucial, and this is exacerbated by a presumption in 
favour of unfairness, how does one rationalize positive measures that seek to ―redress 




Cameron J, seeks to incorporate the concept of dignity by stating that the courts ought to 
―develop a ‗standard to determine whether the implementation of a remedial measure has 
adequately balanced substantive equality with the dignity of the person negatively affected by 
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 Wheereas Van der Westhuizen J seems more concerned with balancing the 
collective dignity of a group versus the individual.
381
 He argues that dignity is a self-standing 
right which must be weighed against the nature and scope of the equality measure. In that 
regard, the learned judge balances the value and right of equality against other rights and 
values, particularly dignity.
382
 The common approach connecting these judgments is that 
dignity continues to define equality and a more complex idea of equality remains 
undeveloped.
383
 On the other hand, the majority judgment adopts an approach in which the 
achievement of equality is informed by the need to overcome unequal power relations and 
disadvantage, whilst being alert to the dignity of all.
384
 Substantive equality is achieved, inter 
alia, by the taking of restitutionary or AA measures, but it cannot be equated with this. In that 
regard, both the majority and minority judgments lack a multifaceted appreciation of the 
objects and principles of substantive equality that would have facilitated a vivid and consistent 
development of section 9 equality jurisprudence. Such an approach could have drawn on the 
Van Heerden case to help weigh and justify the competing claims of discrimination and 





4.6 Concluding remarks 
The court in the LC adopted fairness as the appropriate standard of review for all AA measures. 
This was a deviation from the law as held in the Van Heerden case. It can be argued, however, 
that the LC was justified in that it was subsequently held in the CC that fairness is the 
appropriate standard to ensure that a decision-maker has carefully evaluated relevant 
constitutional and statutory imperatives before making a decision;  particularly one that relies 
predominantly on one of the criteria, such as race, that are normally barred from consideration 
by section 9(3) of the Constitution. Rationality fails as a standard in that it does not incorporate 
the principles of proportionality and fairness as required by the Constitution. Furthermore, with 
regards to the representivity vs. service delivery debate, the SCA is accurate when it suggests 
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that the provisions of section 195 and section 205 of the Constitution should always be borne in 
mind. These provisions impose an obligation on all state organs in the execution of their duties. 
It cannot be stated as a hard and fast rule that representivity prevails over service delivery or 
vice versa, but the provisions of the sections would assist in deciding which should prevail on a 




The judgment in Barnard, being a CC decision is binding on all courts. A court may only 
deviate from this decision if parliament enacts new legislation or if another CC judgment 
decides otherwise.  However, the CC decision is not entirely perfect and therefore future courts 
should adopt its principles cautiously. It is argued that the Barnard case does not set a final 
constitutional benchmark; provide a precise interpretation of the application of s 9(2) to 
employment-related positive measures and employment equity; indicate the nexus between s 9 
and the Act in these matters; and provide certainty on the concept of substantive equality and 
its numerous elemental principles that would form the basis for a coherent reading of s 9.
386
 
This chapter now looks at the strengths and the weaknesses of the Barnard decision and then 
concludes by summarising and integrating all material, before explaining exactly how the 
research questions have been answered. 
 
5.1 What principles should future courts extract from the Barnard judgment? 
The Barnard judgment has been cited as authority for the proposition that  
―…there is no absolute bar to the appointment and advancement of employees from non-
designated groups and that considerations of representivity and numeral targets are not absolute 




Future courts should follow this principle because it cries out for implementers of AA measures 
to adopt a so-called ‗situation specific‘ approach which was proposed in the SCA Barnard 
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case. This approach is ideal because it is flexible and takes into account various relevant 
considerations, including the competence of the candidate and the existence or non-existence of 
a potential candidate in the designated groups, as well as service delivery.
388
 However, that was 
not the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court. The approach of the Constitutional Court 
promulgates for the rigid implementation of AA measures at the expense of other relevant 
considerations. This research therefore urges future courts to disregard the majority judgment 
in the CC and take into account the judgment of the SCA. Furthermore, both the SCA and the 
CC judgments were correct in holding that in the implementation of AA measure, the SAPS are 
bound by the values and principles set forth in section 195 read together with section 205 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
The CC was indeed correct with regards to the issue of the appropriate standard of review for 
AA measures. Rationality as a standard has been criticised for various reasons by several 
academic writers.
389
 The appropriate standard of review is therefore fairness because it is 
flexible and situation sensitive. Furthermore, it ―allows the court to investigate every equality 
claim ―keeping in mind the situation of the complainants in society, their history and 
vulnerability, the history, nature and purpose of the discriminatory practice and whether it 
ameliorates or adds to group disadvantage in a ―real life‖ context‖; and it considers 
constitutional values by ―balancing‖ all these facets to determine its fairness.
390
 However, the 
benchmark for evaluating employment equity plan implementations and AA measures by the 
state remains undecided. Whilst one could argue that the main judgment is precedent for the 
standard of rationality, the judgment‘s concern with the absence of legal argument on the issue 
suggests that the question is open to further consideration.
391
  Furthermore, the court correctly 
identified who the true beneficiaries of AA measures are, those being Blacks, Indians, 
Coloureds, people with physical and mental disabilities and women. Furthermore, the situation 
specific approach advocated by the SCA allows the court to take into account the background 
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of all candidates in deciding whether the candidate was disadvantaged and therefore entitled to 
AA.  
5.2 What future courts should disregard from the Barnard judgment 
Future courts should disregard that first school of thought approach that identifies beneficiaries 
of AA as individuals who belong to designated groups, regardless of whether they are 
previously disadvantaged or not.
392
 This approach requires rigid application of numerical 
targets and quotas. It does not take into account the personal background of the particular 
individual, but instead focuses only on designated groups. This would lead to unfair and unjust 
implementation of AA measures and is likely not to achieve the desired outcome of substantive 
equality. The CC in the Barnard case acknowledges this in stating that ―one must account for 
interactions between the different aspects of identity and privilege when reviewing whether an 
affirmative measure was acceptably implemented.‖
393
 The court also found that SAPS 
acknowledges this by identifying white women as a designated group which must be advanced 
in terms of their employment equity plan and in accordance with the Act.
394
  
Courts should not also adopt rationality standards of review as advocated by the LC for reasons 
already stated above. Furthermore, courts should resist placing too much emphasis on the 
discretion of authority figures tasked with the overseeing implementation of AA measures. The 
courts should fetter this discretion by taking into account the affected individual‘s right to 
equality and dignity as well as the section 195 and section 205 principles. The CC Barnard 
judgment held that it could not interfere with the National Commissioner‘s decision not to 
appoint Barnard in light of the position being non-critical and not affecting service delivery. It 
failed to take into account that the National Commissioner was a public official exercising 
public power, therefore his decision is subject to review on the basis of unfairness and 
irrationality. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The apartheid political system had massive adverse effects on various sectors in South Africa, 
in particular the employment sector, both private and public. Black people were barred from 
most jobs, which were specifically reserved for white people. The end of apartheid marked the 
beginning of a new era for South African citizens, but that era depends on addressing the 
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inequities of the past. AA is one of the policies which seeks to address the effects of apartheid 
employment policies, and has been defined earlier in this research as ―a strategy for the 
achievement of employment equity through redressing imbalances‖
395
 in sectors such as staff 
composition and human resource management practices, inter alia. These imbalances of the 
past are evident in the employment statistics of the apartheid era and the early post-apartheid 
era. Additionally international law obligations, for example, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
396
 and the Constitution
397
 itself, require 
the state to take positive steps to achieve equality. 
 In South Africa, AA was first promulgated in the Constitution through the equality clause.
398
 
Subsequently, the EEA was enacted to give effect to the constitutional provisions relating to 
AA in the workplace. The EEA contains, inter alia, provisions relating to who AA aims to 
promote and who is bound by its provisions. It further provides for an employment equity plan 
and enforcement provisions to ensure that its directives are followed. The EEA seeks to achieve 
goals like the removal of all forms of discrimination, to enable disadvantaged groups to be 
given opportunities and to redress the imbalances of the past. Prior to the Barnard case, the 
locus classicus with regards to AA measures was the Minister of Finance v Van Heerden
399
 
case. According to that particular case, in order for a person to be identified as a beneficiary of 
AA, they must be disadvantaged personally. Furthermore, the court adopted rationality as the 
appropriate standard of review of AA measures. Presently, the Barnard case
400
 is authoritative 
regarding AA policies. According to the majority judgment in the Constitutional Court, a three-
pronged enquiry must be adopted in evaluating AA measures: 
i. ―The measure must target a particular class of people who have been susceptible to 
unfair discrimination; 
ii. It must be designed to promote or advance those classes of persons; and  
iii. It must promote the achievement of equality.‖401 
However, the court went on to say that if the measure is wrongfully applied, the principle of 
legality surfaces, which requires AA measures to be rationally connected to its objectives and 
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to be applied to advance its legitimate purpose.
402
 This means that the court in Barnard agreed 
with the Van Heerden case regarding the appropriate standard of measuring the application of 
AA. The court further held that there was no reason to find that the National Commissioner 
exercised its discretion unlawfully and that this had an adverse effect on service delivery.  AA 
action is a continuing phenomenon and courts will continue to apply the provisions of the EEA 
and the Constitution. Since jurisprudence in relation to AA is evolving gradually, one would 
expect that the law would clarify as new principles develop over time.  
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 Supra note 19 at para 39. 
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